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A family of advanced weapon systems that deserves special attention comprises 
aerial autonomous weapons called Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs), which 
are characterized by the ability to loiter in the target area, sense the targets, acquire the 
targets, and then engage them. Modeling this combination of capabilities in a specific op-
erational setting is necessary for addressing design and operational issues of this weapon. 
This work focuses on the development of an analytic probability model that captures key 
aspects of the autonomous weapon systems’ engagement process. Special attention is 
given to simultaneous attack occurrences, imperfect battle damage assessment, and attack 
coordination properties.  
The model is a continuous-time Markov Chain and for its implementation a state 
generator and an algorithm that computes the transition and limiting probabilities has 
been developed and programmed in Java based software. The Markov-model derives val-
ues for several measures of effectiveness (MOEs), and the average engagement time.  
Different operational scenarios and design configurations are examined in a sam-
ple analysis to demonstrate the model’s capabilities. Tradeoffs among sensing, data proc-
essing capabilities, vulnerability and lethality of UCAVs are explicitly represented with 
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1I. INTRODUCTION 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
The evolution in air-to-ground and air-to-air warfare ranges from guns, unguided 
gravity bombs, and missiles to modern-day unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) and preci-
sion guided munitions (PGM). UAVs are often regarded as an evolutionary step to new 
sensor platforms, predominantly in the reconnaissance and surveillance roles. Other pay-
loads include electronic-warfare suites, communications-relay packages, munitions, sub-
munitions and integrated warheads. Armed UAVs are often referred to as un-
manned/uninhabited combat air vehicles (UCAVs). The distinctions among UAVs, 
UCAVs, and certain precision guided munitions (PGM) as wide area search munitions 
(WASM) are fuzzy and often depend on organization-specific policy and definitions. 
What all of these categories have in common is removing the human being from the plat-
form or providing stand-off capabilities. This has technical and operational advantages in 
many dimensions, but also bequeaths new operational and ethical concerns. 
The use of UAVs removes the risk of aircrew being killed, injured or captured if 
the vehicle is shot down or lost due to mechanical failure. Airframe designs can be 
smaller and lighter than their manned counterparts and can be designed for longer endur-
ance. Also, UCAV platforms are cheaper to buy and operate, and require less expensive 
testing and training. These might be among the main advantages in future planning. 
Modern UCAVs are navigated and guided by radar, video, infrared cameras, la-
sers, and Inertial Navigation Systems (INS) and aided by the satellite based Global Posi-
tioning System (GPS). The enhancement of sensor systems, processor units, decision 
making algorithms, and terminal seekers leads to autonomy for target acquisition, recog-
nition, and attack. These capabilities, combined with inexpensive designs and operational 
opportunities, make UCAVs a disruptive technology on the battlefield. UCAVs enable 
war-fighters to attack targets with weapon systems that can operate in highly defended 
areas, and cause less collateral damage due to enhanced precision. There no longer seems 
to be a trade-off between own casualties and the effect of attacks.  This is especially im-
portant for a society that is perceived as being less and less tolerant of high-casualty en-
2gagements and collateral damage. The progress in commercial technologies, which con-
tinues to lower costs for UCAV systems, is another reason for the increasing interest in 
this type of weapon systems. 
The transition from operating UAVs as sensor platforms to employing UCAVs as 
weapon carriers is a relatively minor technological step, but a major step in war fighting; 
it requires new operating concepts. An even bigger step is reflected in the aspect of 
autonomy, which leads to discussions transcending operational effectiveness and force-
structure efficiency. Experts worry that the more abstract the use of weapon systems be-
comes, the more abstract the enemy becomes, and as humans recede from the battlefield 
as combatants, war will become more likely, not less (Clifford 2000). A more concrete 
discussion includes the shift of the attack decision responsibility from the war-fighter to 
the authority that approves the autonomous engagement and applicable rules of engage-
ment (ROEs) for autonomous systems. Current technology is just mature enough for lim-
ited autonomous engagements and needs more improvement in the important areas of 
target discrimination, identification and attack coordination. Today, algorithms are still 
double-checked by man-in-the-loop doctrines. Autonomous technology is still not com-
pletely unleashed. For the near future, however, UCAV developers believe that the man-
in-the-loop will be the weakest part of the weapon system because humans will be too 
slow for the decision-making cycle, causing underperformance and collateral damage. 
This argument seems reasonable when considering projected future engagement tactics. 
Almost always, it is planned that UCAVs will operate in swarm engagements, mainly in 
time-critical scenarios with the need for split-second decisions. 
The challenge today is seen in the establishment of a new concept of operations 
(CONOPS) that includes doctrine for the proper use of the capabilities and responsibili-
ties of this new generation of weapon systems.  As a result of these considerations, more 
research is necessary on multiple areas of autonomous engagement. These include safety 
as well as performance-enhancing evaluations of UCAV design, engagement tactics, and 
doctrine.  
 
3B. RESEARCH FOCUS 
Most future operational concepts utilize swarm tactics. Larger UAVs, missiles or 
aircrafts release small, expendable, fire and forget UCAVs, designed as Wide Area 
Search Munitions (WASMs) over the target area. The WASMs act in so-called hunter-
killer packs to engage critical targets, high value targets, and targets of opportunity 
autonomously. The wide range of design factors and capabilities of such autonomously 
acting and interacting systems will most likely lead to a wide performance range for en-
gagements in different scenarios.   
 While the importance of exploring these concepts is commonly accepted, the ma-
jority of work still concentrates on the performance of particular UCAVs in special sce-
narios. Most research is dedicated to the evaluation and simulation of the search and de-
tection process, along with the target recognition and target identification processes. 
These factors are important for specifying and comparing the qualities of different UCAV 
designs, and give an estimate of the projected single system performance in a specific en-
vironment and tactical situation. Some research addresses the combined detection, classi-
fication, and attack process and evaluates the influence of imperfect battle-damage-
assessment (BDA), but without considering the performance decreasing impact of simul-
taneous attacks on the same target. This concern is especially important for  assessing the 
impact of battle intensity (detection frequency, attack duration, and UCAV attrition fre-
quency) and the value of communication for attack coordination.  
 Therefore, we consider in our model the following design and operational factors: 
(i) detection rate, (ii) attack duration, (iii) weapon lethality, (iv) system vulnerability, (v) 
target recognition (BDA) capabilities, and (vi) communication capabilities. Additionally, 
scenario factors such as number of employed UCAVs, number of valuable targets in the 
target area, and number of false targets are considered.   
 Depending on the combination of the above listed factors, the effect of a single 
factor varies. This is true for engagements with single UCAVs, and gains more signifi-
cance and complexity in swarm tactics. Therefore, more analytic work is needed to obtain 
deeper general insights into the complex interaction processes of these weapon systems in 
situations where swarm tactics are applied or when search areas of simultaneously em-
4ployed UCAVs overlap. Detection, decision making, and attack processes are modeled as 
simply as possible (but no simpler) to address general issues of the importance of func-
tional design factors on engagement effectiveness. Subsequently, the design, operational 
and scenario parameters are analyzed for their important effects on mission success. 
Next, implications for design and operational parameters are derived from the findings.        
Because autonomous swarm tactics are analyzed, one major focus is the influence 
of attack coordination among multiple UCAVs on the mission success in scenarios where 
a target can be attacked by more than one UCAV. This influence is then compared to the 
influences of other design factors. The analysis also explores trade-off considerations as 
well as optimization approaches. The main contribution of this work is to formulate and 
implement a model that facilitates analysis. The analysis in this thesis intends to demon-
strate the model capabilities and to gain some initial insights regarding design and opera-
tional factors. 
The mathematical model consists of an absorbing continuous-time Markov-Chain 
capable of describing simultaneous multi-attack processes of several UCAVs for each 
target. Model extensions also implement imperfect BDA in the form of classification and 
imperfect coordination properties. This research introduces methods for identifying the 
most important parameters for a particular design configuration in a specific scenario. 
The insights are intended to support the evaluation and identification of the most (cost) 
effective improvements of design capabilities and as guidelines for engagement tactics. 
 
C. MAIN FINDINGS 
In this work we model simultaneous many-on-many engagements with continuous 
time Markov models that contain complex state descriptions and large state spaces.  
The analysis shows that –within reasonable ranges of design and operational pa-
rameters, 
(i)  Coordination is largely a redundant feature. Its effect is strongly dependent on 
other design and operational factors. 
5 (ii)  The probability to correctly classify a non valuable target (specificity) is more 
critical to mission success than the probability to correctly classify a valuable 
target (sensitivity). 
(iii)  The performance decreasing effect of simultaneous attacks on the same target 
in swarm engagements is important enough to be addressed in operational and 
design considerations.  
 
D. STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS AND CHAPTER OUTLINE 
This thesis includes four chapters in addition to the introduction. 
Chapter II presents literature review of current and proposed UCAV designs and 
references to related studies on UAVs and UCAVs. Previous modeling work on UCAV 
engagements is compared to the modeling approach of this thesis. This includes the basic 
assumptions that are used in our models. A set of measures of effectiveness (MOEs) is 
introduced at the end of this chapter. 
In Chapter III, the Markov model and its extensions and modifications are pre-
sented.  
In Chapter IV, we implement the Markov model and its extensions and perform a 
sample analysis for certain UCAV designs and scenarios. The analysis intends to illus-
trate the capabilities of the model and to provide general insights into the dynamics of 
many-on-many UCAV engagements.  
Chapter V summarizes the research, presents the main results, and discusses pos-
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7II. BACKGROUND 
A. UCAVS  
 
1. The Role of UCAVs in War Fighting 
The UCAV technology leads to a large list of possible war fighting applications 
and emerging operational requirements. Some of these requirements are already realized 
in current technologies and in service; others are still about ten years ahead. While only a 
few areas of application are a result of force structure analysis and capability analysis, 
most applications were generated by the availability of the technology resulting from the 
continued use of demonstrators after field tests. Approaches to integrating the UCAV sys-
tems into existing force structure doctrine develop especially slowly (DSB, 2004; De-
fense Daily, 2005). 
 The main application of UAVs today is surveillance and reconnaissance, but in 
the last several years the trend has been established to arm UAVs and assign attack mis-
sions to this kind of UCAV. Still, man-in-the-loop control dominates the operation of 
UAVs/UCAVs, and only non-critical missions are conducted in autonomous mode 
(Sirak, 2002). The option of fully autonomous UCAV operation is quite new and not yet 
implemented operationally. While members of the armed forces have conducted studies 
of how engagements with UCAVs on future battlefields might look, established concrete 
concepts for these kinds of operations are still rare.  
 In a study on UAVs and UCAVs in 2004, the DOD Defense Science Board came 
to the conclusion that the acceleration of the introduction of UAVs into the force struc-
ture is necessary. Further, UCAVs must be considered as an integral part of the force 
structure and not only an “additional asset". Therefore, accelerated procurement and 
equipment of operational units are inevitable. In 1996, the USAF Scientific Advisory 
Board (SAB) conducted a study entitled "UAV Technologies and Combat Operations" 
(USAF SAB, 1996). The purpose was to define future applications for UAV and UCAV  
 
  
8systems, design requirements, and acquisition guidelines, and to describe scenarios and 
operational outlines. The study examined a wide range of potential roles and missions, 
including those involving combat.  
 The SAB identifies 22 different mission types for UAVs and UCAVs, including 
nine with high practical and technological potential for strengthening the current Air 
Force capability by complementing the existing force structure. Six of these nine involve 
armaments carriage: Countering weapons of mass destruction (CWMD), theatre ballis-
tic/cruise missile defense (TBMD/CMD), fixed-target attack, moving-target attack, sup-
pression of enemy air defense (SEAD), and air-to-air engagement. Referring to missions 
today dominated by manned aircraft, the study concludes that "UAVs have the potential 
to accomplish tasks that are now, for either survivability or other reasons, difficult for 
manned aircraft. These include counter-air (cratering runways and attacking aircraft shel-
ters), destroying or functionally killing chemical/biological warfare (CBW) manufactur-
ing and storage facilities, and SEAD.” Further, the SAB identifies a new operational con-
cept of TBMD, the boost phase interception (BFI), which is possible with UCAV tech-
nology. Considering the feasibility and likelihood of the identified mission types and tac-
tics, the study states that most of the “…technologies necessary for platforms, are suffi-
ciently mature to provide [as necessary identified] initial UAV capabilities” and that the 
limits to the employment of UCAVs lie in operational policy and procedural considera-
tions. The reasons for this evaluation of the wide range of mission opportunities include 
the UCAVs' high persistency in the area of interest, stealth properties, and low cost. 
These can be achieved due to the human-independent design. Today, a decade later, 
UCAVs almost reach the human threshold of automatic tracking and target recognition 
that has, until now, prevented war-fighters from passing the attack decision to the system 
(Beal, 2000).  
 For the future, the USAF sees the initial operational role for UCAVs as a "first 
day of the war" SEAD weapon, forming an integral part of the force structure. UCAVs 
are tasked for lethal Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses, tactical jamming, real time sur-
veillance, and Counter C3I (command, control, communications and intelligence), in 
Support of Defense Suppression. UCAVs are planned to conduct a pre-emptive attack on 
integrated air-defense systems, operating from ordinary airfields and flying ahead of the 
9manned strike package, then continuing to provide reactive suppression. Once this initial 
SEAD task has been completed, the UCAVs could switch to strikes against well pro-
tected high-value targets (DSB, 2004).  
 
2. Technological Aspects of UCAVs 
A statement of USAF Air Combat Command summarizes the main aspect by not-
ing that, "Removing the pilot from the vehicle opens up the design space and provides the 
catalyst for exploring clean sheet of paper system design philosophies and concepts of 
operations." (Hewish, 1999). 
 This means that the ability to remove one of the most technology-intensive and 
cost demanding factors from an aircraft design (i.e., the pilot) offers new ways to intro-
duce revolutionary designs, capabilities, and concepts. These include combinations of the 
following:  
• High-altitude flight capabilities and the ability to loiter for several days make 
UCAVs virtually immune for attacks by surface-to-air missiles or fighter aircraft. 
• Small airframe designs with low signatures and enhanced stealth properties can 
penetrate enemy airspace without detection. 
• UCAV designs comprise new, unconventional approaches for start and recovery, 
which might have influence on strategic considerations (SAB, 1996). 
• Quality and safety standards are not necessarily as high as for manned aircrafts. 
Test and Evaluation can be abbreviated to lower development costs. Commercial 
Off the Shelf (COTS) products can find their way into military aviation.   
• Cost of ownership is predicted to be 50-80% lower than manned systems, which 
results from the adoption of condition-based maintenance, minimized use of on-
board sensors, a reduction in fluid-based systems, and a modular avionics archi-
tecture. Without the training needs for pilots and simulation training for the con-
trollers, UCAV flight hours can be restricted to test and evaluation flights. Opera-
tor training can be conducted in simulators, which largely reduces training costs. 
(Sweetman, 2002).  
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• Enhanced Automatic Target Acquisition (ATA) and Automatic Target Recogni-
tion (ATR) capabilities. ATA and ATR allow a weapon to acquire targets of op-
portunity based on parameters programmed into its memory. Eventually, auto-
matic vehicle identification, faster and better than human capabilities, will be pos-
sible. But despite all advances, developers today are aware that “before robotic 
weapons start winning wars, they will have to win the battle against ‘signal-to-
noise'” (Beal, 2000). 
 Currently, ongoing research and development is underway to integrate autono-
mous detection, tracking, target recognition, and attack-coordination functionalities. The 
following overview concentrates on the current development of concepts for the em-
ployment of autonomous attack UCAVs for SEAD, TBMD, and CWMD. 
 
3. Current and Projected UCAV Designs 
 There are two competing strategies that repeatedly show up in all these concepts 
and implementations. The key to these different approaches is the process of target detec-
tion, tracking, and recognition as well as the attack decision.   
 The first strategy places smart weapons on “dumb” launchers or air vehicles, 
which means the transport vehicle has the sole task of starting or transporting the intelli-
gent fire-and-forget weapon to the target area. The intelligent weapon is equipped with 
ATD/ATR functionalities and is capable of attacking the target autonomously. The trans-
port, as well as the weapon, can be a UAV/UCAV, but this description also includes mu-
nitions released by manned aircraft and artillery-launched smart munitions. 
 
a. Autonomous Munitions with ATD and ATR 
The main advantages of this configuration are:  
• Fire-and-forget capability and a higher stand-off range. External target designa-
tion and target illumination are not necessary because the ATD/ATR capabilities 
of the munitions. Therefore, the transport platform can have a lower signature and 
consequently less vulnerability.  
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• Flexibility of attack strategies because simultaneous attacks are not limited by 
constraints of the targeting device. 
• Redundancy of the detection and attack functionalities. There is no single point of 
failure for the targeting and classification mechanism (compared to a targeting 
device that is guiding several munitions). Every single munition contains all nec-
essary functionalities. 
These properties are realized at the expense of: 
• Expensive targeting and processing hardware that is destroyed with the weapon, 
which leads to higher recurring costs. 
• Attack coordination that is harder to implement due to necessary many-on-many 
coordination and communication. If coordination is not implemented, reduced ef-
fectiveness in swarm tactics due to multi-targeting and operational constraints 
(flight level management) can be expected.  
• Lower maintenance and upgrade costs. More expensive hardware upgrades of 
ATD/ATR elements due to higher numbers of munitions compared to transport 
systems. 
The following examples show current realizations of the above configura-
tion. Israel Aircraft Industries builds the ground-launched Harpy drone, which carries a 
passive radiation-homing seeker and a fragmentation warhead. It is truck-launched and 
loiters in the area of a target for extended periods. To extend the engagement possibili-
ties, IAI and Raytheon Missile Systems intend to produce Cutlass, the Combat UAV Tar-
get Locate and Strike System. It refits the Harpy air vehicle with a guidance system based 
on Raytheon’s seekers for the AIM-9X (Sidewinder) and ASRAAM air-to-air missiles 
coupled with an automatic target-recognition and classification system. (Hewish, 1999). 
  As mentioned in the Introduction, the distinction between small UCAVs 
and intelligent submunitions is quite subjective (Hewish, 2002). A number of these 
weapons are currently competing with semi-active guided weapons for a place in the 
Small-Diameter-Bomb-Rack (SDB) of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) (Sweetman, 2002). 
The primary intent is to allow the JSF a higher stand-off range and less time over the tar-
12
get area without loss of effectiveness and precision. The same technology is also pro-
jected to equip larger, longer endurance UAVs with PGM without major changes in the 
targeting system. 
One of these intelligent submunitions is the Brilliant Anti-Armor Submu-
nition (BAT), which is usually dispensed by Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) 
and glides deep behind enemy lines. The target acquisition and attack decision is based 
on a target database and a target acquisition algorithm. In the future, BAT will be able to 
tell the difference between tracked and wheeled armor and perhaps between friendly and 
hostile platforms based on the silhouette of the vehicle (Beal, 2000). Another candidate 
for a place in the SDB rack is Lockheed Martin’s mini-UCAV with integrated warhead, 
the Low Cost Autonomous Attack System (LOCAAS) (Defense Daily, 2004, November; 
Jane’s, 2004, October). It is a loitering intelligent munition that comes in versions with 
and without turbojet propulsion. The propulsion provides loitering up to thirty minutes 
and ranges up to 100 kilometers at a speed between 200 and 300 knots. The loitering alti-
tude is between 300 to 2000 feet. It is designed to be launched by aircraft, UAV, missile 
or directly from a ground-based starter. LOCAAS is equipped with a Laser Detection and 
Ranging seeker (LADAR), inertial navigation system (INS) and target recognition pro-
grams. The primary technical challenge the program currently faces is ATA and ATR. 
These functions will be critical for the weapon to differentiate between different target 
types and decoys, communicate with other LOCAAS, and then conduct strikes. In field 
tests, LOCAAS demonstrated a “near-zero” circular error probability (CEP) and the small 
size and precision of LOCAAS is designed to automatically limit the chance of collateral 
damage (Jane's, 2004). Modifications have been applied, including GPS, range extension, 
seeker improvements, and anti-jam capabilities. LOCAAS search algorithms will be 
based on genetic concepts that evolve using a trial-and-error approach that allows the mi-
croprocessor to remember conditions and create a hierarchy for processing events. De-
spite all advances, there are still concerns about the reliability of the performance in real-
world combat conditions which will most likely lead to a semiautonomous engagement 
mode initially. If equipped with data links, LOCAAS weapons could fly in an attack 
swarm using "wolf pack” tactics to identify and attack targets together. These capabilities 
would enable the UCAVs to establish engagement coordination by broadcasting targeting 
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information. In 2002, the US Naval Surface Warfare Center Dahlgren Division 
(NSWCDD) submitted a proposal for a three year advanced concept technology demon-
stration (ACTD) of the Vertical Launch Autonomous Attack System (VLAAS) proposed 
by Lockheed Martin. This consists of a modified Vertical Launch anti-submarine rocket 
(ASROC-VLA) round carrying four to six units of the LOCAAS in place of the normal 
Mk46 torpedo (Lopez & Sirak, 2002; Jane's, 2002). 
 
Figure 1  Left: Brilliant’s BAT; Right: Lockheed Martin’s LOCAAS 
 
One of the munitions for the Army’s new Non-Line-of-Sight Launch Sys-
tem (NLOS-LS) is the Loitering Attack Missile (LAM), developed by Lockheed Martin 
and Raytheon and based on LOCAAS technology (Space Daily, 2005). It is ground 
launched, carries a LADAR seeker for large area search capability, a turbojet motor, and 
wings that extend on launch. The missile has a 70-kilometer range with a 30-minute loiter 
time and 45 minute cruise with micro turbojet engine. It can loiter over targets of interest, 
conduct ATR and attack targets on its own. LAM provides network capability and ma-
neuver/control elements for redirect, target acquisition, and downlinked images (Haynes 
& Hyman, 2004). 
Another kind of loitering munitions are special artillery munitions. The 
technology and the area of application are similar to the previously-described UCAVs. 
These munitions are released over the target area and detect, classify and attack targets 
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autonomously. The difference is the limited search area, approximately 200 meters in di-
ameter, due to descent by parachute instead of a gliding or propelled phase. An example 
of such a weapon is the German SMArt-155mm munition developed by the companies 
Diehl and Rheinmetall. It is equipped with a multimode seeker featuring an IR sensor, 
microwave radar, and microwave radiometer. Flight characteristics are defined by fins 
and a braking parachute. It contains an explosively-formed kinetic energy penetrating 
warhead (Inabnit, 2002). 
                  
Figure 2  Left: Lockheed Martin’s LAM;  Right: Rheinmetall’s SMart 155  
 
b. Autonomous UCAVs using Munitions without ATD/ATR 
The second strategy places dumb weapons on smart UCAVs. Here, the 
weapon is simply a guided or self-guided weapon without target recognition and attack 
decision. The advantage of this strategy is that the smart platform is recoverable. Espe-
cially for complex ATD/ATR-systems this approach is more cost effective. Advantages 
in particular are: 
• Recurring ammunition unit costs are lower. Expensive ATR hardware can be re-
used. Upgrades of ATD/ATR hardware are less costly because only the targeting 
platforms, rather than every munition, needs to be upgraded. 
• Easier attack cooperation. No communication capabilities are needed for coordi-
nation when the munitions are launched or managed from a single targeting plat-
form. 
15
• Easier to control and coordinate if man-in-the-loop is a required rule of engage-
ment (ROE).  
These advantages come at the cost of: 
• Dependency of all submunitions on the targeting platform. This represents a sin-
gle point of failure for the complete system and limited attack capabilities (re-
sponse time and simultaneous engagement) by the targeting mechanism. 
• Munitions are not necessarily fire-and-forget weapons. This results in enhanced 
vulnerability of the targeting platform and emission control (EMCON) issues. 
• More sophisticated ATD/ATR systems are necessary for the required greater 
stand-off distance needed for maintaining higher survivability. 
  The following examples show current realizations of this concept. Current 
UCAVs using munitions without ATR are Boeing X-45A and Predator equipped with 
Hellfire missiles. There are a number of current acquisition programs to equip larger 
UCAVs with weapon modules (that are based on the SDB-rack) for a variety of tasks 
(Fulghum, 2002). These developments are still preferred over the autonomous munitions 
due to the prevailing USAF policy of man-in-the-loop (Sweetman, 2004). Engagements 
with only few targeting platforms, or forward-observer ground-based targeting and 
autonomy as a fallback option, are still easier to control and are more accepted by public 
opinion (Sirak, 2004).  
 
Figure 3  Boeing’s X-45A 
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  In the early 1990s, the US Ballistic Missile Defense Organization 
(BMDO) proposed a boost-phase intercept (BPI) program that intended a long-endurance, 
high-altitude UAV RAPTOR (Responsive Aircraft Program for Theater Operations) to 
launch a high-velocity missile designated TALON (Theater Application Launch On No-
tice). The missile was planned to engage at a speed of approximately 3.3km/sec and a 
range of 50-220km. The RAPTOR was designed to stay aloft for two days at a height of 
65,000ft and carry two TALONS and the on-board sensors necessary for a BPI engage-
ment. This concept was designed to permit engagement of a Scud from a stand-off dis-
tance of about 100km, or the Chinese CSS-2 from 220km (BMDO, 1994). 
 
4. UCAV Engagements 
This section introduces several engagement scenarios and tactics for UCAVs that 
are proposed in military studies (SAB, 1996; DAB, 2004). 
The first scenario is TBMD where UCAVs launch a counterattack on mobile, bal-
listic missile launching platforms following their attack. The success of the counterattack 
depends on the ability of the UCAVs to engage the launchers before they are camou-
flaged, sheltered or reloaded for another attack. This time period is expected to be about 
ten minutes (Fulghum & Wall, 2000). During this time, the UCAVs must be transported 
to the target area by a hypersonic missile which carries four to twelve UCAVs as pay-
load. In addition, the trajectories of the ballistic missiles must be analyzed, the launcher 
positions must be extrapolated, and the counterattack must be approved. Above the target 
area, the missile decelerates to subsonic speed and releases the payload. The UCAVs start 
immediately and autonomously the loitering and target acquisition phase with the objec-
tive to engage and kill the missile launchers. Due to the relatively precise target position 
information in this case, the average time to detect and engage the targets is relatively 
short. 
These tactics can also be applied for the stand-off engagement of targets with less 
precise target position information. SEAD missions, as well as CWMD missions, can be 
conducted by using fast transport vehicles to bring WASM, like LOCAAS, to the target 
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area. These munitions are equipped with extended loitering and ATD/ATR capabilities 
and can effectively fight targets which are distributed over larger areas. 
Other engagement strategies of small UCAVs exploit their relative low cost for 
exhausting enemy resources and revealing enemy air defense locations. A single UCAV 
costs approximately $40k while surface to air missiles (SAM) cost approximately $100k. 
Therefore, unless the attacked target is defended by an inexpensive and effective point-
defense weapon such as PHALANX, the exchange ratio is in favor of the UCAVs (Mirk-
arimi & Pericak, 2003).  
For intercepting ballistic missiles in the boost phase (BFI), a UCAV at an eleva-
tion of more than 65,000ft could launch a high-velocity missile equipped with an infrared 
seeker, and a kinetic kill vehicle (KKV) (DSB, 1996). The UCAV would benefit from the 
high altitude by being less vulnerable to surface-to-air missile systems, by the enhanced 
detection radius, and by a larger time window for the engagement. The KKV is expected 
to intercept its target at an altitude of 65,000-260,000ft, 25-150km from the launch posi-
tion, with a total elapsed mission time of 20 to 60 seconds. Variants of the weapon would 
also be suitable for engaging cruise missiles, other UAVs, manned aircraft, and surface-
based targets such as TBM launchers and WMD production and storage facilities 
(BMDO, 1994). For these purposes, it is necessary to design a long-endurance UAV plat-
form with ATD/ATR for boost-phase intercept (BPI) of tactical ballistic missiles.  
The US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) has examined 
armed UAVs as part of its Low Cost Cruise Missile Defense program. It planned to use a 
recoverable drone, equipped with inexpensive fire-control sensors and armament, to fa-
cilitate a semi-autonomous engagement of cruise missiles at long range. The drone is ini-
tially ground based and controlled until it reaches the target area where it loiters inde-
pendently. It detects, classifies and attacks cruise missiles autonomously or semi-
autonomously with air-to-air missiles. 
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B. THE MODEL AND PREVIOUS WORK 
 
1. Modeling Requirements 
The mathematical models that represent the deployment and operation of autono-
mous UCAVs have to capture the key aspects of their engagement process. Tradeoffs 
among sensing, data processing capabilities, lethality, and vulnerability have to be explic-
itly represented in the model for the analysis of the employment process in different sce-
narios and under different design considerations. There are four factors that negatively 
affect the performance of a swarm of autonomous UCAVs: (i) multiple kill due to simul-
taneous targeting and attack of a single target by several UCAVs, (ii) multiple kill due to 
misclassification of killed targets (imperfect BDA), (iii) ineffective engagements 
(misses), and (iv) UCAV attrition due to technical failure or interception. To address and 
analyse these factors with respect to the design and scenario parameters, the model must 
include the following analytical capabilities. 
(i) Effects of multi-kill in swarm attack tactics: The mathematical model has to in-
clude methods to describe the effects of multi-kill due to simultaneous targeting 
(multiple acquisition) and imperfect BDA. The model must be able to explore the 
dependency of design and scenario parameters on each cause of multi-kill. 
(ii) The effect of coordination in swarm attack tactics: The mathematical model must 
represent the possible exchange of targeting information among UCAVs and 
evaluate its effect on the outcome of the engagement. 
(iii) Influence of a specific UCAV design parameter: The mathematical model must 
reflect influences of technical and operational parameters (detection rate, sensitiv-
ity and specificity of the sensors, attack rate, UCAV’s failure rate, kill probability 
and level of coordination among UCAVs) on the MOEs.  
 
2. Modeling Approach and Previous Work 
Extensive work has been done in the areas of general search and detection, classi-
fication, and identification. However, analytical work on the whole engagement process 
of UCAVs, including attacks, is mostly restricted to a single or a small number of 
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UCAVs, or assumes centralized control (Decker, 2004). Most of the research on swarm 
tactics with simultaneous engagement is in the form of simulation models. A popular 
model approach is discrete event simulation with simulation APIs, such as the SIMKIT 
Discrete Even Simulation (DES) (Buss, 2005).   
The detection process is described in the literature in several variations. Most 
classic works concentrate on the probability of detecting one or a number of targets in a 
specific area and on the optimization of some search criteria (Koopman, 1980; Stone, 
1975; Washburn, 1980). Richardson, Stone and Washburn wrote surveys on moving tar-
get search problems (Richardson, 1986; Stone & Washburn, 1991). The detection and 
engagement process with imperfect BDA, in the form of Markov models, has been ad-
dressed by Gofer and Kress and explored the impact of imperfect BDA and memory on 
the engagement process of UCAVs with a single warhead (Gofer, 2003). Decker, extend-
ing previous works by Jaques and Pachter, modeled an engagement process for a multi-
warhead UCAV on stationary targets with imperfect BDA for different search scenarios 
(Decker, 2004; Jaques & Pachter, 2002).  
The simultaneous engagement process is splits into six functional components.  
This split is intended to simplify the construction of the complete model by addressing 
each functional component of the engagement process separately. This modular approach 
also facilitates extensions and modifications of the basic model.   
 
a. Search and Detection Process and Attack Mechanism  
Two main factors affect the search and detection component: (i) Detection 
rate and (ii) Detection range. While the detection rate affects the loitering time, the detec-
tion range is necessary for calculating the attack time. We make the following assump-
tions for the search and detection process.  
• Targets form a Poisson Field (Jaques & Pachter, 2003; Decker, 2004). Targets 
move randomly in the target area, such that at any time they are spatially dis-
tributed according to a spatial Poisson distribution. A similar assumption for 
stationary targets is made by Decker and Gofer (Decker, 2004; Gofer, 2003). 
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• Repeated, random, independent, and memory-less search. UCAVs search 
autonomously in a random search pattern. A UCAV has no memory of its 
previous detections or detections of other UCAVs. Therefore, a target (real or 
false) can be detected multiple times. This assumption is necessary to model a 
moving target detection problem without implementing a complex tracking 
algorithm. Reinvestigating a location that earlier contained a false target might 
lead to a target detection due to target movements. 
• Interrupted search and infinite search capability. Following a detection, the 
target is classified instantaneously as a real or false target. If it is classified as 
false target, a new search process is started in which the UCAV might detect 
the same target again (due to the aforementioned lack of memory). The search 
process is not limited by the endurance of the UCAV.  
Under these assumptions, the detection process is a Poisson Process and 
the time to the next detection is an exponentially distributed random variable. Note that 
the rate of this process is an aggregated parameter that depends on a variety of different 
factors, such as UCAV capabilities and scenario properties. If the detection rates for tar-
gets, destroyed targets, and false targets vary due to different signatures, the detection 
processes have to be implemented with target type and status-dependent detection rates.  
This model assumes that the sensors detect a target with a certain, range-
dependent, probability. It also assumes that the detection probability is monotone de-
creasing with distance to the target. That means that a suitable rough approximation for 
the detection range is an exponential distribution truncated by the finite maximum detec-
tion range. Similar detection estimates with exponential detection functions are also used 
by Iida and Koopman as consideration of search effort and detection success (Iida et al., 
2002).  
The attack mechanism depends on weapon characteristics and the results 
of the detection process. Weapon characteristics comprise fire control and trajectories 
that affect the attack time, which is the parameter of interest for the simultaneous target-
ing (multiple acquisition) problem. The time it takes for the UCAVs to travel the detec-
tion range can be considered as attack duration if the classification time is negligible. 
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Consequently, for a constant attack speed, the attack duration has the same distribution as 
the detection range divided by the attack speed. Thus, to simplify the model, we assume 
that the attack duration is approximately  an exponentially distributed random variable.  
For model consistency, the considerations in the detection and attack com-
ponent require that flight (loitering) altitudes for the search phase, in order to be ne-
glected, be small compared to the detection ranges. This is necessary to provide inde-
pendence of the detection frequency and the attack duration and allow use of the expo-
nential distribution for the attack duration. If targets could be detected from high alti-
tudes, the attack duration would be at least the time it takes the UCAV to hit the ground. 
This would not be displayed by the assumed exponential distribution.   
 
b. Classification Process (BDA) 
A detection of a target begins the classification process. Earlier research 
assumed a random time duration of the classification process (Stone & Stanshine, 1971). 
For modern and advanced UCAVs, the classification processing time is negligible com-
pared to the search and attack durations. This work therefore assumes an instantaneous 
classification result. While some works (Decker, 2004) claim a dependency between the 
sensitivity (probability to accept real targets) and specificity (probability to reject false 
targets) of a sensor in analog systems, these parameters are considered to be independent 
in our model to account for capabilities of modern signal-processing systems and provide 
flexibility in the analysis. Our model considers destroyed targets as false targets and uses 
the same detection rate and classification parameters for destroyed targets and false tar-
gets. If the ATR results for destroyed targets and false-targets vary, ATR has to be im-
plemented in the model with target-type and status-dependent detection rates and BDA 
parameters. 
 
c. UCAV Attrition 
The reliability of electronic components and mechanical parts is typically 
expressed in the literature by the exponentially distributed Time Between Failure (TBF).  
The same expression is adopted here for attrition caused by enemy area air defense in the 
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search and attack phase of the UCAV. Both components of attrition are expressed by an 
exponentially distributed time to failure (or removal) of an UCAV. 
 
d. Weapon Effectiveness   
The weapon effectiveness is represented by the frequently used Single 
Shot Kill Probability (SSKP). In this model it represents the probability for a kill if the 
UCAV reaches its target. The SSKP is an aggregated parameter for the UCAVs capabil-
ity to (i) penetrate the target’s close-in defense systems and (ii) the ability to achieve at 
least a mission-kill by hitting the target. This parameter is target-type dependent.  
 
e.  Attack Coordination Mechanism 
We model targeting coordination to assess the benefit of avoiding multi-
targeting situations. Due to the lack of previous work in this area, assumptions are based 
on capabilities of current UCAV-technologies. It is assumed that UCAVs are equipped 
with inexpensive cell phone technology, range-finding targeting devices, and GPS. This 
enables a UCAV to broadcast the target position it is about to attack as well as the attack 
duration. Each UCAV of the swarm keeps an attack list which leads to a rejection of a 
detected target included on that list. Imperfect coordination is implemented by the prob-
ability of correctly receiving a single attack message. 
 
f.  Model Composition 
Since all time-related factors in our model (detection, attack, and attrition) 
are expressed as exponentially distributed random variables, it is possible to compose the 
model in the form of a continuous time Markov model with transient and absorbing 
states.  
 
3. Measure of Effectiveness 
The choice of Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) depends on the context and ob-
jectives of the analysis and on the operational scenario. This section introduces possible 
MOEs applicable for analysis of tactical and design considerations of UCAVs. 
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a. Expected Relative Effectiveness (ERE-1) 
An obvious MOE is the expected number of killed targets. However, to 
compare scenarios with different number of UCAVs, it may be more appropriate to re-
place this MOE with a relative measure. The ratio between the expected number of killed 
valuable targets and the initial number of valuable targets represents the relative effec-
tiveness of the engagement.  
 E [Number of  Valuable Targets Killed]ERE-1  = 
Initial Number of Valuable Targets
 
This MOE is useful for situations where no specific operational thresholds are applicable. 
Other applications include effectiveness studies of different weapon systems or tactics 
under controlled test conditions. 
 
b. Expected Relative Efficiency (ERE-2) 
The second MOE is the ratio between the expected number of killed valu-
able targets and the initial number of UCAVs. It is a measure of weapon’s efficiency. 
This MOE shows the fraction of effective UCAVs and therefore also the fraction of inef-
fective, wasted UCAVs: 
E [Number of  Valuable Targets Killed]ERE-2 = 
Initial Number of UCAVs
 
 
c. Probability to Exceed an Operational Threshold (PET) 
This MOE evaluates the mission success by the probability of exceeding a 
specific operational threshold in terms of number of kills. The operational threshold is a 
minimum fraction  α of the number of valuable targets. 
 Pr[Number of  valuable targets killed  ]   0 1PET Mα α α= ≥ ⋅ < ≤  
where   M = Initial number of valuable targets 
This MOE is used for the evaluation and comparison of missions that have specific op-
erational goals.  
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d. Number of UCAVs to Exceed an Operational Threshold (NET) 
In the context of mission planning, it is of interest to calculate the number 
of UCAVs necessary to exceed an operational threshold with a certain probability χ. Spe-
cifically, 
NETα,χ  =  Minimum number of UCAVs needed to obtain  PETα χ≥  
One extreme application for this MOE is the requirement to kill all targets, α=1, with a 
high probability, χ ∈ {0.9,…,0.99}. NETα,χ  expresses the number of UCAVs necessary 
to accomplish a mission success. This MOE is applicable in particular when the mission 
is to engage critical targets.  
 
e. Expected Duration of the Engagement 
Time considerations always matter when UCAVs are employed to support 
operations in progress. This might be the case for the suppression of enemy air defense 
assets, an attack on supply systems, or the attack on well-protected units. In these cases, 
rapid engagement of enemy forces is an important criterion for the mission success. 
Therefore, for design and tactical considerations, the expected duration of the engage-




Due to the lack of unrestricted specification data and a wide variety of different 
UCAV and smart munition designs, a wide range of possible parameter-values must be 
considered. The values for detection, attack duration, and time to intercept/failure are es-
pecially likely to vary strongly between different scenarios. The parameters that describe 
the classification process and the warhead effectiveness, vary according to the UCAV-
design, target signatures, and engagement tactics. Therefore, wide ranges of possible val-
ues must be considered for these parameters too. The parameters’ base case and their 
ranges are introduced in the Chapter IV. These parameter values are obtained from an 
extensive literature review of unclassified data on current UCAV and Smart-Munition 
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designs, operational ideas and concepts and “educated guesses.” The objective is to dem-
onstrate general issues of simultaneous multi-targeting in swarm tactics with a suitable 




























A. GENERAL DESCRIPTION AND THE STATE SPACE 
A UCAV can be in one of three possible stages: search, attack or removed. A 
UCAV is said to be in a search stage if it is loitering and it has not yet acquired a target. 
Once the UCAV detects a target, it instantly classifies it as valuable or non-valuable. If 
the detected target is classified (correctly or incorrectly) as non-valuable, the target is re-
jected (not acquired) and the UCAV moves on with its search. After a randomly distrib-
uted search time the UCAV detects another target. If the UCAV classifies a target as 
valuable, it enters the attack stage; it instantly acquires the target and then attacks it by 
flying directly at it. The randomly distributed attack time is measured from the moment 
the UCAV detects and acquires the target to the moment the UCAV hits the ground (or 
the target). Once a UCAV is in the attack stage, it is committed to attacking the acquired 
target and therefore cannot go back to the search stage, even if during the attack another 
UCAV hits the target and kills it. Thus, if several UCAVs acquire the same target, at 
most one of them can be effective. At the end of the attack stage the UCAV is destroyed 
and thus removed from further consideration. A UCAV can also be removed during the 
search and attack stages if it is intercepted by the enemy’s air defense or crashes due to 
mechanical failure. We assume imperfect BDA (battle damage assessment); therefore 
classification may be subject to error. A valuable target may be classified as non-valuable 
and therefore passed over by the UCAV, and a non-valuable target may be classified as 
valuable and therefore attacked by the UCAV. We assume that the possible loitering time 
(e.g., due to fuel consumption) is long compared to the time it takes a UCAV to acquire 
and attack a target and the time it (possibly) crashes. In other words, a UCAV never runs 
out of fuel before its mission is over.  
 
1.  Notation 
 The probabilities of correctly identifying a valuable target and correctly identify-
ing a non-valuable target are q1 and q2, respectively. That is, q1 represents the sensitivity 
of the UCAV’s sensors and data processing units, and q2 their specificity. The acquisition 
attempts are independent. The sensitivity and specificity of the UCAV determine its BDA 
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capabilities. BDA (Battle Damage Assessment) refers to the ability of a shooter to distin-
guish between a live target, which is valuable, and a killed one, which becomes non-
valuable. An acquired target is successfully hit and killed with probability p. We assume 
that the search time until detection and the attack time (time between detection and im-
pact) are exponentially distributed random variables with parametersλ andµ , respec-
tively. The mean detection time is a function of the size of the target area, its environ-
ment, sensor performance, target properties, loitering parameters (height, speed, search 
pattern) and weather. The mean attack duration depends on the detection range, attack 
speed loitering height and fire-control capabilities. During the search and attack stages, a 
UCAV may be removed due to enemy interception or mechanical failure. The time until 
(premature) removal has an exponential distribution with average 1/ϕ. The launched pack 
comprises N UCAVs. The total number of targets (valuable and non-valuable) at the be-
ginning of the operation in the target zone is T, out of which M targets are valuable and T-
M targets are non-valuable. 
Recall that each UCAV may be in one of three possible stages: search, attack and 
removed. A searching UCAV detects and instantaneously classifies a target after an ex-
ponentially distributed search time. 
To summarize:       
time to detect and classify a target is distributed as: exp( )
attack phase duration is distributed as: exp( )




    (3.1) 
 
2. State Space Description 
In order to model multi-attack and multi-kill events, a state in the Markov model 
must represent both the searching UCAVs and those which are in the attack stage follow-
ing an acquisition. Moreover, the number of attacking UCAVs and the distribution of the 
attacking UCAVs on the targets have to be explicitly expressed too. In other words, the 
state space should be detailed enough to identify how many targets are attacked, and by 
how many UCAVs each is attacked simultaneously. Accordingly, the state description 
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consists of the number of UCAVs in search mode, n, and the number of targets attacked 
by x UCAVs, mx, {0,1,2,... }x N∈ . A state is described by the vector: 
,0 1 2 x N
attacked valuable targets
total number of valuable targets
0
x
(n, m m , m ,...m ,..., m )
n, x   {0,1,...,N}
m     {0, 1, 2, ...,M}








   (3.2) 
Therefore, the state dimension is equal to the initial number of UCAVs, N, plus 
two.  
 
An absorbing state in the engagement process is of the form 
0(0, ) or ( , 0; 0,... )xm n m x N= = , which means that there are no UCAVs at the 
searching stage (n = 0) and no UCAVs at the attack stage( 0; 1,..., )xm x N= =  or no 
valuable targets alive ( , 0; 0,..., )xn m x N= = . The number of valuable targets killed by 
the UCAVs in an absorbing state is 0M m− .  
 
Example: let M = N = 2. There are 11 possible states: (2,2,0,0), (1,2,0,0), 
(1,1,1,0), (1,1,0,0), (0,2,0,0), (0,1,1,0), (0,1,0,1), (0,1,0,0), (0,0,2,0), (0,0,1,0) and 
(0,0,0,0). For example, the state (1,2,0,0) represents the situation where one UCAV is 
searching and the other UCAV is removed (acquired a non-valuable target or missed a 
valuable target or has crashed or has been intercepted). The state (1,1,0,0) represents the 
situation that the removed UCAV successfully acquired and killed a valuable target. 
Due to the dependencies of n and xm , expressed in (3.2), the following constraints apply 
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      (3.3) 
 
Figure 4 and Figure 5 demonstrate the increasing number of states and state transitions 


























Figure 4  Number of States,  UCAVs and  Valuable Targets 
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Figure 5  Number of State-Transitions, UCAVs and Valuable Targets 
 
3. General Structure of the State Transition 
To simplify the initial exposition, we start off with a basic model where we as-
sume perfect BDA, meaning, detected valuable targets are always classified as such and 
attacked, while detected non-valuable targets are always classified as non valuable and 
rejected. Formally, q1=q2=1. A transition in the Markov model occurs when one of the 
following events happen:  
a) Detection: a UCAV detects a target and examines it 
b) Impact: a UCAV hits the ground following an attack 
c) Removal: a UCAV is intercepted or experiencing a technical failure  
The transition probabilities for detection, impact or removal are obtained as a race of ex-
ponentials. The probability that the next event is detection increases with the number of 
UCAVs in search mode, the number of targets in the area, and the reciprocal of the aver-
age time to detection (1/λ). 






T n m i
λ
λ ϕ µ ϕ
=
⋅ ⋅
⋅ + ⋅ + + ⋅ ⋅∑
     (3.4) 
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The probability that the next event is removal of a UCAV increases with the number of 
UCAVs in search and attack modes and the reciprocals of the average time to intercep-
tion (1/ϕ). 
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     (3.5) 
 
The probability that the next event is be an impact of an UCAV increases with the number 
of UCAVs in attack mode and reciprocal with the average attack time (1/µ). 
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     (3.6) 
 
4. Transition Probabilities under Different Assumptions 
  Different technical and tactical assumptions are implemented for the purpose of 
model development. As with all models, assumptions which might not hold may have to 
be changed. The use of this kind of models allows enough flexibility to deal with changes 
in technical and tactical evaluations. For example, one fundamental assumption is that the 
detection rates for valuable and non-valuable targets are the same. This assumption is ac-
curate when the valuable and non-valuable targets (killed and dummy targets) look simi-
lar through the sensor’s eyes. However, if the target changes its physical properties in a 
way that causes the detection signature for the UCAV’s sensors to change (for example, a 
killed target is burning and the UCAV uses an infrared sensor) then the detection rates 
must reflect this situation. In this example, it might also be necessary to differentiate the 
detection rate for dummy targets due to the lack of movement or the like. 
  The developed state description allows tracking of the number of valuable targets, 
dummy targets, and killed targets by simple subtraction. Given that the detection fre-
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quencies for valuable, killed, and dummy targets are λv , λw, and λd respectively, the 
probability of detecting a valuable target develops to: 
N
( ) ( )
0
0 0 1





v i d w i i
i i i
n m
m T M M m n m i
λ











with the total number of targets, T, and the initial number of valuable targets, M. 
 
This example illustrates how refinements can be applied to other parameters without ma-
jor changes in the model itself. 
 
B. THE BASIC TRANSITION MODEL 
The assumption of perfect BDA implies that only valuable targets are attacked. 
Non-valuable targets, and in particular killed targets, are always identified as non-
valuable and therefore rejected. However, incidents of multiple kills can occur even with 
perfect BDA, when more than one UCAV acquires the same target. If at least one UCAV 
is attacking, the race of exponentials among the searching UCAVs, the attacking UCAVs 
and the removal process determines whether the next state transition is an acquisition of a 
target, an impact of a UCAV or a removal (interception or failure). With the conditional 
probability p, the attacking UCAV kills the target on impact, and with probability (1-p) 
the UCAV impacts and fails to destroy the target. 
Modeling the influence of multi-kill events as a result of multiple acquisition re-
quires differentiating a situation where a target is attacked by a single UCAV from a 
situation of multiple simultaneous attacks. Clearly, if a target is killed by a certain 
UCAV, all other UCAVs that are attacking that target are redundant. Therefore, equations 
(3.4) - (3.6) have to be modified to account for the situation of a number of simultaneous 
attacks on a particular target. 
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The following transitions are possible from state (n, m0, m1, …. mn) in this sce-
nario: 
 
(i) A searching UCAV has detected a valuable target already under attack by (x-1) 
UCAVs, classifies it correctly and attacks it. The probability is calculated by a 
race of exponentials where one of the mx-1 targets that are currently attacked by (x-
1) UCAVs wins.  
(n, m0, m1, …. mn)    ⇒   ( n-1,…, mx-1 - 1, mx + 1,…, mn)   
∀  x ∈ {1,2,…,n}  | ( mx-1>0) ∧ (n > 0)       with probability 
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     (3.7) 
 
(ii) A searching UCAV detects a valuable target, correctly classifies it as non-
valuable target and continues searching.  
(n, m0, m1, …. mn)    ⇒   (n, m0, m1, …. mn)    
∀   (n > 0)         with probability 
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    (3.8) 
 
(iii) An UCAV impacts on a valuable target under attack by x other UCAVs and kills 
it. The transition is expressed by removing the x-times attacked target. All 
UCAVs which attacked this target are automatically removed with the target:  
(n, m0, m1, …. mn)    ⇒   ( n, ..., mx - 1,…) with  x = {1,2,…n}  
∀  x ∈ {1,2,…,n}  | ( mx > 0)        with probability 
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( ) ( )
1
race of exponentials favoring an impact 
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    (3.9) 
 
(iv) The state transition shown below can result from two events: (1) ineffective im-
pact on a target, which is currently attacked (acquired) by x UCAVs and (2) re-
moval of an attacking UCAV  that attacks  a target, which is currently attacked 
(acquired) by x UCAVs.    
(n, m0, m1, …. mn)    ⇒   ( n, ..., mx-1 + 1, mx –1,....) with  x ∈ {1,2,…,n}  
  ∀  x ∈ {1,2,…,n}  | ( mx > 0)    Ineffective Impact on a Target   
 ∀  x ∈ {1,2,…,n}  | ( n > 0)    Interception in attack mode 
 
with the transition  probability for Ineffective Impact:  
( )
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    (3.10) 
 
and the transition  probability for Interception in attack mode: 
( )
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(v) A searching UCAV is intercepted: 
(n, m0, m1, …. mn)    ⇒   ( n-1 m0, m1, …. mn)       
∀   ( n > 0)     with  probability  
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C. IMPERFECT BDA  
The UCAVs must classify detected targets in order to start their attacks. If BDA is 
not perfect, this classification may be erroneous. Detected valuable targets can be classi-
fied as non-valuable and rejected, and non-valuable targets can be classified as valuable 
and therefore attacked. The degree of BDA depends on the UCAV’s sensor performance 
and classification capabilities, on environmental factors and on enemy tactics.  
The following model is an extension of the basic model and implements limited 
BDA properties. The limited classification BDA is expressed by the UCAV’s capability 
to i) correctly classify a valuable target with the probability q1, and ii) correctly classify a 
non-valuable target with the probability q2. 
The consideration of these probabilities, which influence the accept/reject deci-
sion (where accept=attack) leads to new transition events. A detected valuable target 
might be rejected and a detected non-valuable target might be attacked. The attack on a 
non-valuable target is expressed by the transition:  
(n, m0, m1, …. mn)    ⇒   ( n-1, m0, m1, … mn )    ∀  (n > 0) 
It has the same state transition formulation as an interception of an UCAV. However, the 
transition probabilities must be recalculated. 
(i) The probability of an attack on a valuable target that is under attack by (x-1) 
UCAVs  is :  
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This transition probability is a generalization of the probability in (0.8) 
 
(ii) The probability that a UCAV detects and attacks a non-valuable target is: 
( )
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    (3.14) 
 
(iii) A detected valuable target is rejected if the UCAVs erroneously classifies it as 
non-valuable, and a non-valuable target is rejected if it is classified correctly. 
Thus, the rejection probability incorporates both the sensitivity of the UCAV and 
its specificity and is given by:  
( ) ( ) 2 10 0
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    (3.15) 
 
The state-transition probabilities remain unchanged in all other cases, as ex-
pressed by (3.9) - (3.12) of the basic model, 
 
D. IMPERFECT COMMUNICATION AMONG UCAVS  
Suppose that the UCAVs can broadcast targeting information to other UCAVs at 
the time of the acquisition. If another UCAV receives this information, it would refrain 
from acquiring this target and will continue its search. Thus, this broadcast provides a 
form of attack coordination. The signal that is sent out by the attacking UCAV, which 
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stays on during the entire duration of the attack, is received and processed correctly by 
any searching UCAV with a fixed probability r. The signals from the various attacking 
UCAVs are independent. Thus, a searching UCAV that detects a target currently engaged 
by x other UCAVs will not attack it with probability 1-(1-r)x. Perfect coordination, r = 1, 
implies that no events of multi-kill due to simultaneous engagements can occur, while for 
r = 0 no targeting information transfer exists.  
To implement attack coordination, the state space must be able to describe how 
often a target has been reported as attacked. This is necessary for valuable as well as non-
valuable targets. Recall that the state space description of the basic model only allows for 
tracking the valuable targets; there is no explicit representation for multiple acquisitions 
of non-valuable targets.  Therefore, the effect of targeting coordination on the probability 
of simultaneous attacks on non-valuable targets is neglected. However, when the specific-
ity is high (q2 is close to 1) or the total number of targets is high compared to the number 
of UCAVs, this effect is negligible and the state space description of the basic model can 
be applied.  
 
1. Transition Probabilities –The Approximate Case 
The following model extends the above models by implementing possible attack 
coordination by imperfect transmission of targeting information. The state space descrip-
tion of the basic model is used for simplicity, with the limitations noted in the previous 
paragraph. Therefore, the model description is restricted to scenarios with high specific-
ity, (q2 close to 1). The incorporation of possible attack coordination into the model adds 
another rejection criterion; a target classified as valuable can now be rejected if it has 
been declared as being acquired by another UCAV and this message is received by other 
UCAVs. The transition probabilities change for the cases of:  
(i) Acquisition of a valuable target.  The acquisition probability of a valuable target 
extends formula (3.13) with the condition that an acquisition of an x-times simul-
taneously attacked target occurs only if all targeting transmissions have failed. In 
that case, the transition probability from  
state  (n, m0, m1, …. mn)  to state  ( n-1,…, mx-1 - 1, mx + 1,…, mn) is 
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(ii) Rejection of a target. A target is passed over when it is classified as non-valuable, 
or if it is classified as valuable but at least one attack message by a UCAV is re-
ceived. The probability for the rejection of a target is   
( ) ( )( )
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All other transition probabilities remain the same as for the model extension with 
limited BDA properties. 
 
2.  Transition Probabilities:  The Complete Case 
a. The State Description 
To describe also multiple acquisition of non-valuable targets, the state de-
scription of the basic model must be extended. To track attacks on non-valuable targets, 
the easiest implementation is to mirror the case of valuable targets, that is,  
, , ,v0 v1 vx vN w0 w1 wx wN
attacked valuable targets attacked non-valuable targets
total number of valuable targets total 











n, x    {0, 1, 2, ...,N}
m     {0, 1, 2, ...min(M,N/x)}  x>0
m    {0, 1, 2, ...min(M,N/x)}  x>0








Here, mvx and mwx denote the number of valuable targets and non-valuable targets that are 
simultaneously attacked by x UCAVs respectively.  
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b. State Transitions 
Analogous to the case where multiple acquisitions are recorded only for 
valuable targets, the transitions for the complete case are:  
(n, mv,0, ...mv,x..., mv,N  ,mw,0,... mw,x,..., mw,N):  
(i) Acquisition of a valuable target, that is simultaneously attacked by (x-1) UCAVs: 
(n, mv,0,..., mw,N)  ⇒  (n-1, mv,0, ...mv,(x-1)-1, mv,x+1,..., mw,N)    with probability 
( )
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(ii) Acquisition of a non-valuable target that is simultaneously attacked by (x-1) 
UCAVs: 
(n, mv,0,..., mw,N)  ⇒  (n-1, mv,0, ...mw,(x-1)-1,…, mw,x+1,..., mw,N)   with probability 
( ) ( )
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(iii) Rejection of a target: 
(n, mv,0,..., mw,N)  ⇒  (n, mv,0,..., mw,N)   with probability 
( )( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( 1)
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(vi) Interception of an UCAV in search mode: 
 (n, mv,0,..., mw,N)  ⇒  (n-1, mv,0,..., mw,N)    with probability 
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(vii) Effective impact (kill) on a target, that is simultaneously attacked by x UCAVs: 
Note, that with the status change at impact, the other x-1 attacking UCAVs attack 
a non-valuable target. 
(n, mv,0,..., mw,N)  ⇒  (n, mv,0, ...mv,x-1,…, mw,(x-1)+1,..., mw,N)  with probability 
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(vi) Interception of an UCAV in attack mode on a valuable target, that is simultane-
ously attacked by x UCAVs and Ineffective impact on a valuable target, that is si-
multaneously attacked by x UCAVs  
(n, mv,0,..., mw,N)  ⇒  (n, mv,0, ... mv,(x-1)+1, mv,x-1,..., mw,N)   with probability 
( )( )
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(vii) Interception of an UCAV in attack mode on a non-valuable target, that is simulta-
neously attacked by x UCAVs and Impact on a non-valuable target, that is simul-
taneously attacked by x UCAVs 
 (n, mv,0,..., mw,N)  ⇒  (n, mv,0, ... mw,(x-1)+1, mw,x-1,..., mw,N)   with probability 
( )
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IV. ANALYTICAL DESIGN AND RESULTS 
A. ANALYTICAL DESIGN 
 
1. Implementation of the Mathematical Model 
The mathematical (Markov) model is implemented in the Java programming lan-
guage, in which an auto generation algorithm for state description, state space, state tran-
sition, and transition probabilities has been developed. The high memory demand for 
running the program is handled by the utilization of forward star data structures (Ahuja et 
al., 1993), which is necessary in order to manage large state descriptions and large state 
spaces that are typical to real-world scenarios.  
 
Figure 6  Screenshot of the Input/Output Window of the Java-Implementation  
 of the Markov Model. 
 
The model output is saved as text file and analyzed by MS EXCEL and the statis-
tical package SPSS. 
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2. UCAV Design Points and Scenario Data 
a. Categories of Parameters  
The parameters of the model can be categorized in different ways. One 
way is to separate among design-related parameters, operational parameters, and sce-
nario-related parameters. Since all of the parameters in this model, except T, are deter-
mined by factors of several different categories, a more relevant categorization of the pa-
rameters is into functional groups like detection, decision, survivability, and effective-
ness. 
 
b.  Reasonable Ranges for Parameter Values  
  From the overview of UCAV technologies and doctrine in Chapter II, rea-
sonable ranges for parameter values have been derived (see Table 1). Due to the restricted 
nature of original weapon specifications, the data used for this analysis is based on free 
available information and educated guesses. The high number of different UCAV designs 
as well as the large spectrum of operational tasks result in a large range of values for the 
parameters and the state variables (number of UCAVs, N, number of valuable targets, M, 
number of total targets, T).  
 
Parameter Symbol Low ADP High 
Classification Sensitivity q1 0.6 0.8 1.0 
Classification Specificity q2 0.8 0.9 1.0 
SSKP p 0.6 0.8 1.0 
Communication Capability r 0 0 1 
Avg. Time to Detection
Avg. Attack Duration
 µ / λ 1 n.a. 40 
Avg. Time to Detection
Avg. Time to Attrition
 ϕ / λ 0 n.a. 1 
 
Table 1. Parameter Values for the Analysis.  




3. Analytical Approach  
First the parameters p, q1, q2 are fixed at their assumed design point (ADP; see 
Table 1). We start off the analysis by varying the time related parameters λ, µ, and ϕ  in 
scenarios with different numbers of UCAVs and false targets. Recall that in Chapter 3 we 
used the terms valuable targets and non-valuable targets. In the following, the term false 
targets is used for the initial number, (T-M), of non-valuable targets to emphasize impacts 
of starting conditions of the scenario. The term non-valuable targets is used for the sum 
of false targets and destroyed targets. 
In the analysis, the term simultaneous multi-targeting (SMT) is frequently used to 
describe situations where a target that is currently under attack is detected (targeted) by 
other UCAVs. Depending on BDA, these detections can lead to simultaneous multi-
attacks in cases without attack coordination. In cases of perfect attack coordination, SMT 
results in the certain rejection of a valuable target. 
The first part of the analysis is done to identify at what values of the time-related 
parameter combinations does simultaneous multi-targeting (SMT) become an important 
influence factor. The results of this first step are used to identify two design points, one 
with strong and one with weak SMT impact. In a second step, sensitivity analysis with 
respect to p, q1, q2, and r at those two points is conducted.  
The scope of this analysis is to provide insights into the dynamics of the combat 
situation and into the tradeoffs among some of the parameters (in particular, the effects of 
simultaneous multi-targeting). The analysis in this chapter is not intended to be exhaus-





1. Identification of Multi-Targeting Situations 
a. Effect of Detection, Attack, Attrition, and Coordination for Dif-
ferent Numbers of UCAVs  
Figure 7 shows the impacts of detection rate, attack rate and attrition rate 
on the relative effectiveness of the engagement process. Recall that ERE-1 expresses the 
relative expected number of destroyed valuable targets. The time dependent parameters λ, 
µ, and ϕ  are expressed as ratios, µ/λ and ϕ/λ, since the model depends on the ratios of 
these parameters and not necessarily on their absolute values. To demonstrate the impact 
of multi-kill due to SMT, we start off with a base case of four valuable targets and one 
false target, where p, q1, q2 are at their ADP. The term “comms” in Figure 7 indicates the 
cases with perfect communications, which also means perfect attack coordination (no si-
multaneous attacks on the same target occur). 
 
Figure 7  Influence of detection, attack, vulnerability, and coordination on ERE-1 
 (10 UCAVs,  4 valuable Targets, 5 total Targets, ADP) 
 
  Note that for small ratios (<4) of µ/λ ERE 1 is quite small. This observa-
tion is caused by different reasons. The main reason is the relative attrition with respect to 
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the detection rate (ϕ/λ). Recall that in our model the search and the attack phases have the 
same attrition rate ϕ . 
  Example: Assume a constant detection rate, λ, and a constant attrition rate, 
ϕ.  Consequently the ratio ϕ/λ must be constant too. For small attack durations, most of 
the attrition events occur in the search phase. If the attack duration increases (decreasing 
µ/λ), more and more attrition events occur in the attack phase. This is observed in Figure 
7 with the decrease of ERE-1 for ϕ/λ=const and decreasing µ/λ. Therefore, the total attri-
tion (search and attack phase) increases even if   ϕ/λ  is kept constant.  
  This effect is amplified by higher vulnerabilities, ϕ/λ. Recall that small ra-
tios of µ/λ mean long attack durations compared to the detection times and greater ϕ/λ 
mean shorter times to UCAV removal compared to the detection times. For values of µ/λ 
> 4, the impact of this ratio on ERE-1 is approximately linear up to µ/λ = 8. Above this 
value, the dependency of ERE-1 on µ/λ is negligible for ϕ/λ<0.5. For the cases without 
attrition in Figure 7 the difference for ERE-1 with and without communication shows the 
impact of SMT. It is obvious that the effect of SMT is strong for values of µ/λ< 4, weak 
for, 4 / 8µ λ≤ ≤ , and not important for values above 8. Note that perfect attack coordina-
tion does not necessarily enhance the performance of the pack of UCAVs, as one would 
expect. For small values of µ/λ and  high relative attrition rates ϕ/λ=1 the opposite is 
true; ERE-1 without coordination is in fact higher than with coordination. For low attri-
tion rates and higher µ/λ, attack coordination enhances the performance of the pack. 
Thus, the influence of coordination through communication on the effectiveness of the 
attack depends on the combination of the time-dependent parameters.  
  Example for small µ/λ: Suppose a UCAV that rejects a valuable target be-
cause this target has been reported as being attacked. Before the UCAV can attack an-
other valuable target, it is removed due to the high attrition rate. In the meantime, the re-
ported attack on the valuable target fails. 
  Further note that for large values of µ/λ and the case of no attrition 
(ϕ/λ=0), the gap between the coordination and no-coordination cases decreases with in-
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creasing µ/λ. This can be explained by the decreasing occurrence of SMT with increasing 
µ/λ and hence decreasing advantage benefits of coordination. 
 We will now examine if this observations are valid for other combinations 
of N, M, and T. Figure 8 shows the influence of different numbers of attacking UCAVs 
on the expected relative efficiency with and without communications.  
 
Figure 8  Influence of detection, attack, vulnerability, and coordination on ERE 1:
 Left: 7 UCAVs,  4 valuable targets, total of 5 targets, ADP  
 Right:  4 UCAVs,  4 valuable targets, total of 5 targets, ADP 
 
 The results with four and seven UCAVs confirm the initial observations. 
Note that with smaller numbers of UCAVs the presence of attack coordination is more 
effective for higher attrition (larger ϕ/λ value) and longer attack durations (smallerµ/λ). 
 In the case of four targets, small µ/λ value and no attrition (ϕ/λ=0), an in-
crease of ERE-1 is observed. This is a result of the small number of initial false targets 
(T-M=1). Here, attack coordination leads to SMT-free target allocation without great 
danger of misclassification. If the attack duration is shorter, the probability to detect a 




b. Influences of Detection, Attrition, and Coordination for Different 
Numbers of False Targets 
We continue with the exploration of the influence of false targets on the 
previous observations. Figure 9 compares this influence for the extreme-points of our 
UCAV-attrition scale, that is without attrition (ϕ/λ = 0) and with high attrition (ϕ/λ = 1).  
 
Figure 9  Influence of detection, attack, vulnerability, and coordination on ERE 1: 
 Left: ϕ/λ = 0, 10 UCAVs,  4 valuable targets, ADP   
 Right:  ϕ/λ = 1, 10 UCAVs,  4 valuable targets, ADP 
 
Again, the initial findings are supported. In the case of no attrition, the at-
tack is always more effective when there is full coordination among the UCAVs. Since 
the UCAVs are not threatened, the rejection of a valuable target due to attack coordina-
tion does not imply the risk of removal. In the case where the UCAVs’ attrition rate is 
compatible with their detection rate this may not be so. As the ratio ( / )µ λ  between the 
attack rate and the detection rate decreases (attack time gets longer compared to the de-
tection time) the effectiveness of UCAVs’ coordination decreases to the point that it be-
comes counter-effective. Note that the break-even point increases and shifts to higher ra-
tios ( / )µ λ  with increasing number of false (non-valuable) targets T-M. This explains as 
follows: Every detection process with imperfect specificity 2( 1)q <  may result in errone-
ous attacks. Coordination among UCAVs decreases the attacks on valuable targets that 
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are already being attacked, and increases the number of detection events. Therefore, with 
decreasing µ/λ, more detections occur during the time of attacks on valuable targets, 
which results in more attacks on false targets. This leads to the point that unsuccessfully 
attacked valuable targets cannot be re-attacked because the UCAVs have been expended 
on false targets. 
   Example for small µ/λ: Consider a UCAV which rejects a valuable target 
because this target has been reported as being attacked. At the next target detection, the 
UCAV misclassifies a false target and attacks it. In the meantime, the reported attack on 
the valuable target fails to be successful. This effect is getting smaller with increasing µ/λ 
due to the decreasing probability of SMT.  
 
c. Influences of Detection, Attrition, and Coordination for Different 
Numbers of Targets  
We will now explore the influence of µ/λ, and ϕ/λ for different numbers 
of valuable targets. We compare scenarios with M = 4 and 6 and T = 10. 
 
Figure 10  Influence of detection, attack, vulnerability, and coordination on ERE 1:  
 Left: 10 UCAVs,  4 valuable targets, 10 total targets, ADP  
 Right:  10 UCAVs,  6 valuable targets, 10 total targets, ADP 
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Our previous observations are again confirmed. We further observe that 
with higher relative numbers of valuable targets, the positive impact of coordination on 
the expected relative effectiveness is more significant.  
 
d.  Time Dependent Impacts and Base Cases for Sensitivity Analysis  
Two base cases of combinations of µ/λ and ϕ/λ  are now defined for fur-
ther sensitivity analysis. The first base case, µ/λ=1, represents situations with strong im-
pacts of the detection frequency and attack duration on ERE-1. The second case charac-
terizes the transition point from moderate to weak impacts of µ/λ on ERE-1. Following 
the findings in this chapter, we select µ/λ=4. In both cases we choose a moderate UCAV 
attrition, ϕ/λ=0.1, that means, the average lifespan of a UCAV is 10 times longer than it 
takes for a UCAV to find a single target in the target area.   
 
2. Sensitivity Analysis with Strong and Moderate Impacts of µ/λ 
The following sensitivity analysis is with respect to the aforementioned two base 
cases.  Base case “A” represents situations with strong influences of SMT and moderate 
attrition (µ/λ=1, ϕ/λ=0.1) and base case “B” represents situations with moderate influ-
ence of SMT. In both base cases, the sensitivity analysis is performed with respect to the 
assumed design point (ADP, see above). 
 
a.  Influence of Classification Capabilities 
  The target classification capabilities comprise classification sensitivity (q1) 




Figure 11  Influence of Classification Sensitivity (q1) on  ERE-1:   
 Left: µ/λ=1,  4 valuable targets, 10 total targets, ADP   
 Right:  µ/λ=4,  4 valuable targets, 10 total targets, ADP 
 
  The impact of changes of the classification sensitivity (q1) on the expected 
relative effectiveness is similar for both base cases. ERE-1 increases nearly linearly by 
2% with an 20% increase of q1. This observation is largely independent of the number of 
UCAVs.  
 
Figure 12  Influence of Classification Specificity (q2) on  ERE 1:   
 Left: µ/λ=1,  4 valuable targets, 10 total targets, ADP  
 Right:  µ/λ=4,  4 valuable targets, 10 total targets, ADP 
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 In both base cases the impact of the classification specificity on ERE-1 is 
significantly stronger than the impact of sensitivity. The impact of q2 in base case B is 
somewhat stronger than in A. Figure 13 shows the impact of different combinations of q1 
and q2 on ERE-1 for scenarios with N = 10 UCAVs attacking T = 10 targets out of which 
M = 4 are valuable targets. In both cases, the performance enhancing influence of increas-
ing sensitivity is decreasing with increasing specificity. A non intuitive observation is the 
decreasing expected relative effectiveness with increasing q1 for perfect specificity, q2=1. 
This can be explained by the effect of SMT. Lower values for q1, with more rejections of 
valuable targets, slow down the attack frequency and act as SMT-inhibitor. Therefore, the 
performance increases with decreasing classification sensitivity in scenarios with low at-
trition and high specificity.  
  
Figure 13  Influence of Classification Sensitivity and of Specificity on  ERE 1: 
 Left: µ/λ=1, r=0,  10 UCAVs,  4 valuable targets, 10 total targets, ADP 
 Right:  µ/λ=4, r=0,  10 UCAVs,  4 valuable targets, 10 total targets, ADP 
 
  Figure 14 shows the same settings with perfect attack coordination. Note 
that q1 no longer has a negative impact on ERE-1. On the contrary, the performance of 
the UCAVs increases slightly with increasing q1 due to the smaller impact of UCAV at-
trition with higher q1. 
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Figure 14  Influence of Classification Sensitivity and of Specificity on  ERE 1: 
 Left: µ/λ=1, r=1,  10 UCAVs,  4 valuable targets, 10 total targets, ADP 
 Right:  µ/λ=4, r=1,  10 UCAVs,  4 valuable targets, 10 total targets, ADP 
 
b. Influence of UCAV Guidance and Warhead Effectiveness 
For the SSKP, a strong influence on the expected relative effectiveness in 
both base cases is observed.  
 
Figure 15  Influence of SSKP (p) on  ERE 1:      
 Left: µ/λ=1, 10 UCAVs,  4 valuable targets, 10 total targets, ADP 
 Right:  µ/λ=4, 10 UCAVs,  4 valuable targets, 10 total targets, ADP 
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The smaller the SSKP, the higher is the sensitivity of ERE-1 to it. These 
observations for the impact of the SSKP are also found valid for cases of perfect coordi-
nation (r = 1).  
 
c.  Influence of Attack Coordination 
Figure 16 shows the effect of the coordination capability among UCAVs. 
 
Figure 16  Effect of Coordination (r) on  ERE 1:     
 Left: µ/λ=1, 10 UCAVs,  4 valuable targets, 10 total targets, ADP 
 Right:  µ/λ=4, 10 UCAVs,  4 valuable targets, 10 total targets, ADP 
 
 At high numbers of UCAVs and a strong effect of SMT (µ/λ=1), commu-
nication decreases performance. Figure 17 shows the dependency of the effect of coordi-
nation level, r, and the classification specificity on ERE-1.  
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Figure 17  Influence of Coordination and BDA on  ERE 1:    
 Left: µ/λ=1, 10 UCAVs,  4 valuable targets, 10 total targets, ADP 
 Right:  µ/λ=4, 10 UCAVs,  4 valuable targets, 10 total targets, ADP 
 
Clearly, the performance decreasing effect of communication at (µ/λ=1) is 
amplified with decreasing classification specificity, q2. Note the negative gradient of 
ERE-1 in base case A (µ/λ=1) and classification specificity smaller than 0.95 (q2<0.95). 
In this situation, there is an optimum value, r* ≠ {0,1}, of the communication probability 
for which ERE-1 is maximal. Note that this counter-intuitive result does not apply to base 
case B. These results demonstrate once again the tradeoff among the level of coordina-
tion, the relation between the detection and attack times, the BDA capabilities and the 
UCAVs’ vulnerability. 
  
d.  Influence of the Detection Rate 
 The impact of varying the detection rate, λ , for 10 UCAVs, 4 valuable 
targets, and 6 false targets (10 total targets) is now examined. The impact on the engage-
ment performance is displayed for selected values of attack durations, attrition rates, 




Figure 18  Influence of Detection Rate and BDA (without coordination) on  ERE 1: 
 Left: µ=1, ϕ=0.1, 10 UCAVs,  4 valuable targets, 10 total targets, ADP 
 Right:  µ=4, ϕ=0.1, 10 UCAVs,  4 valuable targets, 10 total targets, ADP 
 
  Again, the tradeoff effect of the different performance-decreasing factors 
can be observed. At smaller detection rates, UCAV attrition  decreases  performance, 
while at higher detection frequencies SMT decreases performance.  
 
Figure 19  Influence of Detection Rate and Coordination on  ERE 1:   
 Left: µ=1, ϕ=0.1, 10 UCAVs,  4 valuable targets, 10 total targets, ADP 
 Right:  µ=4, ϕ=0.1,  10 UCAVs,  4 valuable targets, 10 total targets, ADP 
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 Figure 19 shows the impact of the average detection rate for different 
communication qualities on ERE-1 at the ADP. A counterintuitive observation is the 
strong drop in engagement performance for perfect communication. This phenomenon 
has already been explained above as a combination of imperfect BDA and SSKP (i.e., 
q2<1 and p<1). 
 
e. Influence of the UCAV Attrition Rate 
 The impact of the UCAVs’ attrition rate on ERE-1 is displayed in Figure 
20 for different values of coordination levels.  
  
Figure 20  Influence of Attrition Rate and Coordination on  ERE 1:   
 Left: µ/λ=1, 10 UCAVs,  4 valuable targets, 10 total targets, ADP 
 Right:  µ/λ=4, 10 UCAVs,  4 valuable targets, 10 total targets, ADP 
 
The graphs show that the expected outcome of the attack is very sensitive 
to the UCAV’s attrition rate within the assumed parameter ranges. The graphs show that 
communication capability does not compensate for deficiencies in vulnerability. 
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f. Influence of the Number of False Targets 
  The number of false targets (false targets = initial non-valuable targets: T-
M) and the classification specificity are tightly connected in their impact on the engage-
ment effectiveness. Figure 21 displays and compares these factors in the two base cases. 
 
Figure 21  Influence of False Targets and BDA on  ERE 1 (Without Coordination):
 Left: µ/λ=1, 10 UCAVs,  4 valuable targets, 10 total targets, ADP, r=0 
 Right:  µ/λ=4, 10 UCAVs,  4 valuable targets, 10 total targets, ADP, r=0 
 
  Clearly, the number of false targets does not matter for perfect specificity. 
As q2 decreases, the negative effect of increasing numbers of non-valuable targets be-
comes more significant. The different results for ERE-1 in Figure 22 show the impact of 
attack coordination to compensate SMT effects. 
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Figure 22  Influence of False Targets and BDA on  ERE 1 (With Coordination): 
 Left: µ/λ=1, 10 UCAVs,  4 valuable targets, 10 total targets, ADP, r=1 
 Right:  µ/λ=4, 10 UCAVs,  4 valuable targets, 10 total targets, ADP, r=1 
 
3. Operational Considerations 
An important operational planning problem is to determine the number of UCAVs 
that are necessary to accomplish mission success. The following example demonstrates 
an analysis of this problem. To emphasize the operational character of this example, we 
scope this analysis to factors that are considered (by war-fighters) for decision making 
(N, M, T, λ, r) for a fixed UCAV design (q1, q2, p) and fixed average attack duration and 
attrition rate (µ, ϕ). 
We assume q1=0.8, q2=0.9, p=0.8, r=0 for the basics design, r=1 if a communi-
cation module is included and not jammed. We further assume an average attack time of 
1/µ=0.5 minutes, attrition rate of ϕ=0.1 min-1 and detection rate of  λ=[0.2,...,1] min-1 
(µ/λ=[2,…,10]; ϕ/λ=0.1). We assume that based on intelligence reports there are 10 tar-
gets in the target area, out of which 2 to 6 are valuable targets.  
The engagement planning process may include the following nine questions that 
can be answered with the corresponding graphs.  
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(1) & (2)  How many UCAVs do I need to destroy all of the targets with a probabil-
ity of at least 50% and what is the expected time of the engagement? 
Observe in Figure 23 that, under given design and scenario conditions, the effort 
to destroy all targets is fairly high. For example, to destroy 4 valuable targets with a prob-
ability of 50%, 10 UCAVs have to be deployed.  The average duration of the engagement 
shows the two reasons for fast finishing scenarios when either (i) a small number of valu-
able targets is quickly destroyed by a high number of UCAVs (at N>5, M=2), or (ii) a 
small number of UCAVs is quickly expanded on a larger number of targets (at N=10, 
M=6).  
 
Figure 23  Probability to kill all valuable targets and average engagement duration  
 Parameters: λ=1, µ=2, ϕ=0.1, p=0.8, q1=0.8, q2=0.9, r=0, T=10 
 
(3) & (4)  What percentage of valuable targets is going to be destroyed with how 
many UCAVs and what is the change in performance without attrition? 
Figure 24 shows the percentage of destroyed valuable targets dependent on the 




Figure 24  Fraction of killed valuable targets with and without attrition   
 Parameters: λ=1, µ=2, p=0.8, q1=0.8, q2=0.9, r=0, T=10 
Left: Attrition Rate ϕ=0.1;  Right: No Attrition, ϕ=0 
   
Clearly, attrition is not an important factor in this scenario, because the absence of 
attrition only provides a 3% increase of ERE-1in this scenario. Stealth considerations or 
other efforts to decrease UCAV-vulnerability are therefore not necessary.  
 
(5) & (6)  How many UCAVs are still (on average) loitering when the mission is ac-
complished and what percentage of the UCAVs is effective? 
Figure 25 shows the average percentage of unexpended UCAVs at the end of the 
scenario. Recall that the end of the scenario is when either all UCAVs are expended or 
when all valuable targets are destroyed. ERE-2 in Figure 25 shows the relative efficiency 
of the engagement, that is, how many valuable targets are killed by one UCAV. With in-
creasing numbers of engaging UCAVs the engagement efficiency decreases nearly linear 
and at a constant rate for different numbers of initial valuable targets. 
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Figure 25  Fraction of not expanded UCAVs and Engagement Efficiency  
 Parameters: λ=1, µ=2, ϕ=0.1, p=0.8, q1=0.8, q2=0.9, r=0, T=10 
 
(7) & (8)  Is it useful in this scenario to engage with UCAVs that are equipped with 
attack coordination and what is the effect of deviations of the assumed av-
erage detection rate? (we assume 4 valuable targets and a total of 10 tar-
gets) 
 Figure 26 shows that in this scenario any improvement of attack coordination ca-
pabilities results in higher engagement performance. The impact of attack coordination 
on ERE-1 is more important for smaller numbers of UCAVs. However, the implementa-
tion of perfect attack coordination has roughly, for all N, the same effect on ERE-1 as the 
increase of the number of UCAVs by one in the scenario. ERE-1 shows only small sensi-
tivity regarding to the detection frequency (about 2% over the assumed range of λ). The 
optimal performance for the assumed detection frequency is at λ=0.4 min-1 (µ/λ=5) with 
slightly decreasing ERE-1 to higher detection rates and stronger decreasing ERE-1 to 
lower detection rates.  
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Figure 26  Avg. fraction of killed targets, communication and detection rate   
 Parameters:, µ=2, ϕ=0.1, p=0.8, q1=0.8, q2=0.9, T=10, M=4  
 Left:  Impact of attack coordination by communication, r, for λ=1  
 Right: Impact of different average detection rates, λ, for r = 0  
  
 
(9) What impact do higher numbers of false targets have on the mission suc-
cess? (we assume 4 valuable targets) 
Figure 27 shows the strong impact of the presence of false targets (T-M) on the 
engagement effectiveness. A decrease of roughly 20% in ERE-1 is created by increasing 
the total number of targets from 10 to 30. This shows that even if the classification speci-
ficity with q2=0.9 seems high, improvements for q2 are necessary for scenarios with high 
false target density. An operational approach to this problem is to choose engagement 
conditions (i.e.-day/night), where greater differences of target signatures between valu-




Figure 27  Avg. fraction of killed valuable targets, total targets, and UCAVs  
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
A. MODEL 
The main contribution of this thesis is a new continuous time Markov Model, 
which is utilized to analyze swarm engagements of UCAVs on targets. The model is im-
plemented in Java-based software that generates the state-space, computes the transition 
probabilities and derives values of key MOEs. The model and its implementation demon-
strate an effective and efficient analytic alternative for commonly used Monte-Carlo 
simulations. The model handles large scale state-spaces that correspond to realistic com-
bat situations. 
The model is tractable, has fast run times, produces the desired results (MOEs) in 
one run, and has the potential to be utilized in optimization (NLP) analysis. The model 
also has the flexibility to adapt to different assumptions while still using the initial state 
space description. Model extensions and modifications can take account of new modeling 
requirements, such as multiple target types, while still using the same systematic model-
ing approach. 
 
B. PERFORMANCE FACTORS 
The model describes the impact of four main performance factors that affect the 
outcome of the engagement: (i) multi-kill due to simultaneous targeting and attacks, (ii) 
multi-kill due to misclassification (imperfect BDA), (iii) ineffective impacts on targets, 
and (iv) UCAV attrition due to technical failure, accidents or interception. These factors 
are analyzed with respect to design and operational parameters such as detection rate, at-
tack rate and number of targets. It was found that different performance factors dominate 




a. Multi-Kill due to Simultaneous Multi Targeting (SMT) 
Recall that SMT describes the effect that a target, that is under attack, is 
detected and investigated (targeted) by other UCAVs. Depending on the result of the 
classification, this can lead to simultaneous attacks of multiple UCAVs on the target. This 
factor is important if the attack durations are short compared to the time to detection. If 
the two times are approximately the same, the SMT has a performance decreasing influ-
ence of about 5% for reasonable parameter values. The implementation of attack coordi-
nation eliminates this impact of SMT. However, attack coordination amplifies attrition 
effects and the impact of multi-kill due to imperfect classification. 
 
b. Multi-Kill due to Misclassification (BDA) 
This factor gains importance for lower classification specificities and 
higher numbers of false targets. For the assumed design point (ADP) of specificity q2 = 
0.9 and equal numbers of valuable and false targets (T-M), the performance-decreasing 
impact of misclassification is about 10-15% compared to perfect specificity.  If the ratio 
between the valuable and false targets changes from 1 to 0.5, then the engagement per-
formance drops by 5% for the ADP and by 10% for q2 = 0.8. 
 
2. UCAV Attrition 
This factor has a strong performance decreasing influences for long attack times, 
long detection times and low classification sensitivity (q1). An attrition rate that is about 
10% of the detection rate has a performance decreasing influence of about 5% for the 
ADP when compared to the case of no attrition. Decreasing classification sensitivity 
augments attrition effects due to longer loitering times. Attrition is also a significant fac-
tor in the presence of attack coordination in combination with long attack times and high 




3. Attack Effectiveness 
Lower SSKP, has a strong influence in cases where a second attack on the target 
is unlikely. This occurs for small numbers of UCAVs compared to the number of targets. 
Attack effectiveness is also important in the presence of attack coordination in combina-
tion with (i) high attrition rates and long attack times and/or (ii) low classification speci-
ficity and many false targets. For the assumed design point, SSPK at p = 0.8, the per-
formance-decreasing impact of imperfect SSKP is about 10% compared to perfect SSKP.   
 
C. DESIGN PROPERTIES AND INFLUENCE FACTORS 
 
1. Influence of Classification  
It was shown that at design points of interest, the impact of classification specific-
ity (q2) is more important than classification sensitivity (q1). Also, with increasing num-
bers of false targets and in scenarios with strong SMT combined with attack coordination, 
specificity gains additional importance as a performance influencing parameter. The per-
formance always increases with the classification (BDA) specificity. Classification sensi-
tivity influences the number of detection occurrences and therefore the inter-attack time 
by the likelihood to accept a detected valuable target. It gains more importance for design 
points with lower specificities and high attrition rates, where a rejection of a valuable tar-
get holds a high risk of loosing the UCAV to attrition or to an attack on a non-valuable 
target. 
 
2. Influence of Communications 
Depending on the design point, the presence of communication for attack coordi-
nation, as implemented in the model, can have performance enhancing or decreasing 
properties. At certain design points, the best engagement results are obtained with partial 
communication (0 < r < 1). 
Communication increases performance only in SMT situations, especially for low 
attrition rates, high classification specificity and high SSKP. Attack coordination prevents 
the waste of ammunition due to simultaneous attacks on the same target. In scenarios 
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with low attrition and high specificity, targets attacked without success can be attacked 
again later on. Decreases in engagement performance as a result of attack coordination 
can be observed for SMT situations with high attrition and/or low classification specific-
ity in combination with decreasing SSKP.  The reason is this:  When valuable targets are 
rejected due to attack coordination, but the attacks do not result in certain kills, UCAVs 
are expended on (i) attacks on false targets or (ii) attrition. Later, further attacks on tar-
gets cannot be conducted because all UCAVs are expended. This means that good design 
features are further improved by attack coordination, while for less effective design 
points with SMT effects, communication can actually decrease the performance. This is a 
counter-intuitive and important result of the analysis.  
 
D. IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
1. Design Considerations 
The findings allow general conclusions about UCAV designs:  
• The most important UCAVs’ design factors in the explored parameter range are 
SSKP and classification specificity. Designs have to concentrate primarily on 
minimizing (i) attacks on false targets and (ii) ineffective hits.  
• In case of equal average attack and detection times and the presence of attack co-
ordination, it is important to tailor the attack coordination for the specific UCAV 
design and scenario to obtain optimal performance. Depending on the scenario pa-
rameters and the design parameters, attack coordination must account for the pos-
sibility of letting a specific number of UCAVs simultaneously attack the same 
target. This can be accomplished by adjusting the value of the coordination pa-
rameter r.  
• It may be useful to introduce adjustable, random attack delays after classification 
of a target. This may reduce SMT effects absent attack coordination. This feature 
would represent an additional target observation state with repeated classification 
before the actual attack after the random time period occurs, and would therefore 
basically extend the detection time. However, this is only recommended for sce-
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narios with low attrition rates. Another approach to dealing with SMT is the im-
plementation of continuous classification during the attack phase and the abortion 
of the attack, with return to the search mode if the target status changes. 
• For new UCAV designs, this model can be used to explore globally optimal pa-
rameter combinations. Sensitivity analysis or local optimization starting at the 
current design point can be conducted for design enhancements. 
 
2. Operational Considerations 
In the following, it is assumed that the UCAV design is fixed and only the en-
gagement planning can be altered. 
If the UCAVs do not possess attack coordination, and the analysis shows strong 
impacts of multi-kill due to SMT, engagement tactics in waves, rather than simultaneous 
swarm, should be considered. Other tactical solutions include enlarging the target area to 
reduce the detection rate and therefore SMT, or assigning separate areas to the UCAVs. 
The latter, however, means losing the benefits of swarm attacks (area-redundancy, low 
organizational efforts). 
If the UCAVs possess the capability for attack coordination, it is important to ad-
just communication or deactivate communication for cases where attack coordination 
leads to decreased performance in the scenario. As analyzed above, this situation is pos-
sible for scenarios with SMT (relatively long attack times compared to detection times) 
and small SSKP in combination with (i) small classification specificity and many false 
targets, and/or (ii) high attrition rates.  
 
E. FUTURE WORK 
Our model is restricted to one type of targets. In real life scenarios, there are dif-
ferent target types with different signatures. Subsequent work might include the devel-
opment and implementation of a model modification for multi-target type scenarios.  
Also, this model assumes low altitude attacks and can therefore justify exponen-
tially distributed detection ranges and times. For higher loitering altitudes, the time it 
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takes the UCAV to reach the surface must be considered. This requires model modifica-
tions for attack times with different distributions containing constant and random ele-
ments that would account for (i) attack phases starting at higher altitudes and (ii) for dif-
ferent detection and attack processes.  
The development and software implementation of an optimization shell for the 
Markov model is capable of providing solutions for optimal cost-performance considera-
tions. This process could start from current UCAV design points to suggest design en-
hancements for fixed budgets. 
Data analysis on a large scale can explore multi-parameter cost-performance op-
tima. A suggested analytic design for this purpose is the Latin Hypercube (Cioppa, 2002). 
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